Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Chile\u27s Accession to the NAFTA and the Fast-Track Debate by Miller, Melissa Ann
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 31 
Number 1 Fall 1996 pp.153-190 
Fall 1996 
Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Chile's Accession to the NAFTA and 
the Fast-Track Debate 
Melissa Ann Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa Ann Miller, Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Chile's Accession to the NAFTA and the Fast-Track 
Debate, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 153 (1996). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
WILL THE CIRCLE BE UNBROKEN?
CmLE'S ACCESSION TO THE NAFIA
AND THE FAST-TRACK DEBATE
I. INTRODUCTION
The process by which international trade agreements are negotiated,
concluded, and implemented into United States law has undergone a significant
transformation since the original framers first designated both the executive and
legislative branches as the primary participants in the furtherance of United
States trade relations abroad.' Until the latter part of the twentieth century,
foreign trade agreements were accomplished through a series of steps which
often proved to be inexpedient and unpredictable.' In addition, an atmosphere
of distrust and a reluctance to cooperate evolved from the interactions between
Congress and the executive branch in the formulation of foreign trade policy
In 1974, however, Congress implemented a new tool for formulating
international trade agreements which marked the beginning of not only greater
cooperation between the legislative and executive branches, but also an
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2. See also Edmund W. Sim,
Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. J. INT'L L. 471, 476 (1990)
(stating that the Constitution mandates that the executive and legislative branches engage in a
balancing of power as far as the formulation of foreign trade policy is concerned); C. O'Neal
Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a
Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 1, 15 (1994); infra notes 21-145 and accompanying
text.
2. Ilona B. Nickels, NAFTA's Passage Through Fast-Track, MEX. TRADE & L. REP., Mar.
1993, at 7. See also Natalie R. Minter, Fast-Track Procedures: Do They Infringe Upon
Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGis. & POL'Y 107, 107 (1995) (noting that
the implementation of trade agreements into law often took months under traditional congressional
approval measures); infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
3. Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the
Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 201-10 (1987)
(discussing the relationship between Congress and the executive from the years 1930 to 1984); Sim,
supra note 1, at 476 (explaining that a combative relationship between Congress and the executive
branch resulted from their overlapping roles in foreign trade). See also Taylor, supra note 1, at 18.
As a result of the friction between the executive and legislative branches in defining United States
trade policy, two myths evolved. Id. First, the executive branch began to presume that Congress
was too protectionist to be trusted with the formulation of trade agreements. Id. at 19. Second,
Congress believed that the executive branch could not be trusted to cooperate with the legislative
branch. Id. at 20. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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innovative procedure which expedited the entire treaty-making process. 4 This
instrument, known as fast-track authority, is the means through which Congress
authorizes the President unilaterally to negotiate international trade agreements
for a limited period of time.5 However, the President must keep Congress
updated on the progress of the negotiations, seek congressional input, and submit
the final agreement to Congress for approval.' At the same time, fast-track
authority provides that Congress, when presented with the final draft of the
agreement, can either approve or reject the proposal without attaching extensive
modifications to the agreement.' Despite many constitutional objections to this
trade tool, fast-track procedures result in the execution of international trade
agreements in an efficient and expeditious manner while simultaneously meeting
the demands of both Congress and the executive branch."
Nevertheless, Congress, in recent years, has become increasingly reluctant
to grant fast-track authority to the President for the negotiation of trade
agreements. 9 This reluctance, often based on a variety of peripheral and
irrelevant factors, threatens the effectiveness of fast-track authority and
jeopardizes the competitiveness and credibility of the United States in the rapidly
developing world order of international trade.'0 For example, Congress is
considering granting fast-track authority for the negotiation of Chile's accession
4. Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 143, 144 (1992) (explaining that fast-track procedures serve a two-fold purpose: while enhancing
the President's negotiating credibility, fast-track also promotes presidential accountability to
Congress). See also Ellen G. Yost, The United States Perspective on Negotiations for a Nonh
American Free Trade Agreement, 5 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 67 (1992).
5. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 151-53, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193 (1988)). See also Hongju Koh, supra note 4, at 143-44; Vanessa Patton
Sciarra, Note, Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast Track Guarantee
Procedure, 97 YALE L.J. 1439, 1453-57 (1988).
6. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, §§ 1102-1103, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902-2903
(1988). See also Hongju Koh, supra note 4, at 146 (stating that the legislative veto effected a
compromise in which the President gained more negotiating authority, while Congress was assured
a comprehensive consultative process with the executive).
7. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(a)(l)(B). See also Steve
Charnovitz, No 7me for NEPA: Trade Agreements on a Fast Track, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
195, 201 (1994) (stating that fast-track authority was created to insure that implementing legislation
needed for a trade agreement would be voted on by Congress without amendments).
8. Charnovitz, supra note 7, at 197. But see id. at 197 n.73 (citing Brief for the Appellants
at 12-13, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No.
93-5212) (stating that the fast-track rules are a direct reflection of the President's inherent power
over international relations)).
9. Stephen Fidler, Chile Gloomy on NAFTA Prospects, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1995, at 6.
10. Mike Pariente, New Kid on the Block: Chile's Struggle to Join the North American Free
Trade Association, HISPANIC, Apr. 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS, at *5. See also
Chile is Left Waiting at the Altar, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 1995, at 28 [hereinafter Chile Left Waiting];
Peter Morton, Isolationist Fever Creeps into U.S. Politics, FIN. POST, Dec. 2, 1995, at 6.
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to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)," which is currently
comprised of the United States, Canada, and Mexico."2 The accession of Chile
to the NAFTA would constitute a significant step towards the realization of a
free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere. 3 Absent fast-track procedures,
the President of Chile refuses to negotiate with the United States regarding
Chile's accession to the NAFTA. 4 However, Congress is vacillating on its
decision to grant fast-track authority based on economic, environmental, labor,
and purely partisan factors.' 5 This hesitation not only threatens to derail a
potentially valuable addition to the NAFTA table, but also places United States
trade policy at risk. 6 Therefore, the present status of fast-track authority must
be revised in order to preserve the roles of the executive and legislative branches
in foreign trade, while simultaneously promoting the trade interests of the United
States in a more productive and expeditious manner.
This Note examines the use of fast-track authority in the implementation of
international trade agreements. More specifically, this Note will illustrate the
need to modify fast-track procedures by reflecting upon Congress' reluctance to
grant fast-track authority for the negotiation of Chile's accession to the NAFTA.
In addition, this Note will set forth a proposed revision of fast-track procedures
with the objectives of furthering United States international trade objectives, and
of insuring the United States' role as a leader in the new world order of free
trade.
11. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The NAFTA was formed to effectuate the
eventual total reduction of tariffs among the signatories. Id.
12. Pariente, supra note 10 at *1 (noting that during the Summit of the Americas in Miami in
1994, President Clinton formally invited Chile to become the fourth member nation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement).
13. Georges Fauriol & Sidney Weintraub, U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the Southim Cone, WASH.
Q., Summer 1995, at 125. The Miami Summit called on all of the governments in the Western
Hemisphere to establish a free trade area from Canada to Tierra del Fuego by the year 2005. Id.
14. U.S. Lawmakers Want Chile NAFTA "Fast Track," METALS WK., Aug. 21, 1995, at 12
[hereinafter U.S. Lawmakers] (explaining that Chilean officials have indicated that they will not sign
any NAFTA agreements until fast-track authority has been approved, arguing that full congressional
review without fast-track procedures would amount to negotiating membership in the free trade
agreement twice).
15. Fidler, supra note 9, at 6. See also Pariente, supra note 10, at *1. Pariente notes that
opponents to fast-track authority argue that labor and environmental standards, human rights, anti-
drug enforcement, and issues regarding the democratic development of nations should not be tied
directly to free trade agreements. Id. In addition, as the presidential election draws near, politicians
will be driven to do what is best for their partisan interests, instead of adhering to what is best for
the nation. Id.
16. See infra notes 197-223 and accompanying text.
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Section II of this Note will briefly explore the history and development of
fast-track authority in the foreign trade policy of the United States. 7 Section
III will focus on fast-track procedures in general and will examine the
constitutionality of this trade tool. 8  Section IV will detail the present
controversy regarding the accession of Chile to the NAFTA and the possible
consequences resulting from Congress' failure to grant fast-track authority to the
President.' 9 Finally, Section V will set forth a proposed modification to fast-
track authority and the goals that will be achieved by such modification."° '
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY
A. 7he United States Constitution and the Making of International Trade
Agreements
The original framers of the United States Constitution created a unique
democracy in which each of the three branches of government may fulfill its
own responsibilities and duties, free from the influence and interference of the
other branches." At the same time, however, the Constitution permits one
branch to seek assistance from another branch in meeting its duties.Y This
interdependence, therefore, results in an often combative atmosphere.' For
example, both the legislative and executive branches are endowed with the
authority to participate in the negotiation of international trade agreements.
24
Article I of the Constitution provides Congress with the power to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations."' At the same time, Article II views the
President as the United States' representative in all international matters and
17. See infra notes 21-101 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 102-45 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 146-223 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 224-51 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. arts. I-Ill. See aLso Sim, supra note 1, at 472 (noting that the Founding
Fathers wished both to restrict and to empower future leaders by creating a separation of powers);
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 61 (1989) (illustrating that this division of authority among the three branches
reflects the system of checks and balances created by the Constitution).
22. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). See also Sim, supra
note 1, at 472 (stating that the Constitution established a tripartite system of government in which
the authority was shared jointly by the President, the Congress, and the Judiciary).
23. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 15; Sim, supra note 1, at 476. The Constitution forces the
legislature and the executive to engage in a precarious balance of power with regard to trade
agreements. Id. at 472. However, despite their many successes, their failures to cooperate "dot the
history of international commerce." Id. The International Trade Organization, which was proposed
after World War 11 and which faded away as a result of the lack of cooperation between Congress
and the executive, exemplifies such a failure. Id.
24. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that the negotiation of international trade agreements
requires the participation of these two branches of government).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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bestows upon the executive the authority to enter treaties.' Therefore, the
process of negotiating and concluding international trade agreements mandates
cooperation between the two, often opposing, branches of government.27
The use of fast-track procedures is a product of modern times.' Before
the advent of modern fast-track procedures, the President submitted international
trade agreements to Congress for approval." However, without the efficiency
provided by the fast-track process, Congress often took considerable time to
approve and to implement the necessary legislation since it was not bound by a
restrictive timetable." In addition, both the House of Representatives and the
Senate were entitled to attach amendments or to redact portions of the
agreement. 3 Thus, not only were the original intentions of the parties to the
agreement severely compromised by such practices of Congress, but the
credibility of the United States in the eyes of its trading partners was diminished
as well.32 Fast-track authority, on the other hand, expedites the congressional
approval process by ensuring that Congress deals with a trade agreement as a
complete package.33
Prior to 1934, Congress played a dominant role in the formulation of
international trade agreements and the execution of foreign trade policy.' The
President, on the other hand, was restricted to the fulfillment of inconsequential
responsibilities.3" Congressional dominance in the area of international trade,
however, was short-lived. In 1930, despite the warnings of leading economists,
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
27. Sim, supra note 1, at 472 (explaining that while the President may negotiate international
agreements, only Congress may implement legislation affecting international commerce into domestic
law).
28. Pariente, supra note 10, at *1 (stating that fast-track authorization has been used in every
piece of trade legislation considered by Congress since World War I). See also Hongju Koh, supra
note 4, at 146 (noting that prior to 1974, trade agreements had been accepted into law either as
congressional-executive agreements or as sole executive agreements).
29. Nickels, supra note 2, at 8.
30. Id. See also Minter, supra note 2, at 108 (stating that in the absence of fast-track, the
implementation of a trade agreement often takes months under normal congressional procedures).
31. Nickels, supra note 2, at 8. By amending negotiated trade agreements, Congress had the
power to alter the original expectations underlying the agreement. Id.
32. See also Charnovitz, supra note 7, at 199 (illustrating the President's inability to assure
foreign negotiating parties that the agreement will reflect their expectations under normal
procedures).
33. Minter, supra note 2, at 109 (stating that this process insures that the original version of
the trade agreement, which is submitted by the President, will be the version Congress votes upon).
34. STEPHEN D. COHEN, THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
7 (1977); ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929-1976, at 79 (1980); Taylor, supra note 1, at 17.
35. Sim, supra note 1, at 475 (describing United States trade policy as being "based almost
entirely on congressionally controlled tariffs ... with the President limited to ministerial tasks").
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Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Ac which was aimed at
sustaining the economic prosperity enjoyed by the United States in the years
following World War L" This Act set tariffs at their highest level in the
history of the United States' and has been attributed as the primary cause of
the Stock Market Crash of 192939 and the Great Depression.' As a result,
Congress, having been publicly condemned for its traditional adherence to
protectionist trade policies, enthusiastically turned the reins of international trade
policy-making over to the executive branch in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act of 1934. 4' This Act gave the President, for a certain period of time, wide
latitude in unilaterally negotiating trade agreements, thereby insulating Congress
from further political disasters.42
36. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1206-1677 (1988)).37. Id. See also The History of Protectionism Proves the Value of Free Trade, INSIGHT,
Summer 1992, at 24. The prevailing attitude of the years immediately preceding World War I was
that the United States could sustain and even dramatically increase the effects of the economic boom
of the "roaring 20's" by sharply raising tariffs. Id. Congress also believed that American
businesses, which had expanded into new markets as a result of the war, needed protection as infant
industries from foreign competition. Id. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, enacted to meet these
concerns during the Hoover administration, increased the tariffs on most imports, including minerals,
chemicals, dyes and textiles. Id. Tariffs were raised on more than one-thousand articles in trade
resulting both in the retaliation by at least twenty-six other nations against the United States and in
the Depression of the 1930's. Id. In response to this overt protectionism, other nations increased
their own tariff levels, to the detriment of the United States. Id. In the first year following the
enactment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, customs revenues plummeted from $600 million to $250
million. Id. In addition, the United States' foreign trade decreased from $9.6 billion to $2.9 billion.
Id. The crash in customs revenues and exports led to a sharp decrease in the United States
Treasury, thereby triggering the Depression of the 1930's. Id. It should be noted that President
Woodrow Wilson twice vetoed such measures stating that: "We must abolish everything that bears
even the semblance of privilege or of any kind of artificial advantage, and put businessmen and
producers under the stimulant of a constant necessity to be efficient, economical and enterprising."
Id. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act is still in force today and applies to nations which do not enjoy
Most Favored Nation status with the United States. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally PASTOR, supra note 34. But see Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin,
Trade Blocs, Currency Blocs and the Disintegration of World Trade in the 1930's, NAT'L BUREAU
ECON. RES. 1, 1-5 (1993) (disagreeing with the premise that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was a
major cause of the Depression in the 1930's).
40. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 17.
41. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (1988). See, e.g., Sim,
supra note 1, at 475 (describing Congress' humiliation as a result of the Smoot-Hawley debacle);
GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONALTRADE AGREEMENTS 19 (1992) (noting
that the United States, upon enacting the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, recognized for the first
time that the settihg of tariffs was an action that could be negotiated with other nations).
42. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act § 1351(a). Under this Act, the President's unilateral
negotiating power was extended for three years. Id.
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In 1962, Congress attempted to take back some of the power previously
granted to the executive branch in negotiating international trade agreements by
enacting the Trade Expansion Act,43 which required the President to seek
congressional approval for all trade agreements." This Act was intended to
provide Congress with greater control over the content of international trade
agreements.' However, as a glaring illustration of the distrust and lack of
cooperation that exists between Congress and the executive branch, President
Johnson refused to abide by the Trade Expansion Act during the negotiations of
the Kennedy Round4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),47 and entered the GATT with neither congressional authorization nor
approval. 4 As a result, Congress enacted domestic legislation which, in effect,
nullified President Johnson's agreement.49 In addition, Congress refused to
grant any further unilateral negotiating authority to the executive until 1974.'
43. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (repealed 1975).
44. Id.
45. Id. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 continued to allow the President to negotiate
international trade agreements; however, it required the President to submit the agreement to
Congress for final approval. Id. See also Sim, supra note 1, at 475. Sim noted that in the
legislative history of the Trade Expansion Act, Congress directed that the United States' antidumping
law not be affected by negotiations conducted by the President. Id. In fact, Congress enacted this
Act primarily because of its fear that President Johnson, in the negotiation of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), would agree to the inclusion of non-tariff barriers, such as
antidumping measures. Id. at 476. The regulation of non-tariff barriers falls beyond the scope of
Article I's designation of congressional powers; thus, by requiring the President to submit the final
draft for approval, Congress could ostensibly control the content of the agreement and preclude the
proposed antidumping provisions. Id. See infra note 49.
46. RALPH H. FOLSOM Er AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 21 (3d ed. 1995) (defining "rounds" as formal negotiations of the GATT
which facilitates "the discussion of international trade barriers on a multi-nation level, rather than
having world trade arrangements be the result of an aggregate of bilateral agreements").
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (6th ed. 1990) (defining GATT as "[a] multi-lateral
international agreement that requires foreign products to be accorded no less favorable treatment
under the laws than that accorded domestic products"). See also 7he History of Protectionism
Proves the Value of Free Trade, supra note 37, at 24. The GATT, established during the global
reconstruction following World War II, was created to address the issue of tariff and non-tariff
barriers against trade. Id. This treaty was signed at the Geneva Trade Conference in 1947 and was
formed to address mutlilateral trade issues and the resolution of trade disputes. Id. The basic
principle underlying the GATT is the Most Favored Nation Status, which dictates that member states
treat all other GATT members equally. Id. See also FOLSOM, Er AL., supra note 46, at 318
(describing Most Favored Nation Status as the policy that trade barrier restrictions, when enacted
by members of the GATT, should apply equally to all trading members rather than only to a limited
few).
48. Taylor, supra note 1, at 18. In response to the perceived constraint on his negotiating
authority, President Johnson entered into the agreement and adopted the antidumping code, contrary
to Congress' mandates. Id. See also Sim, supra note 1, at 475.
49. Sim, supra note 1, at 476 (stating that Congress negated the agreement by making it
subsidiary to existing United States law).
50. Id.
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B. The Birth of Fast-Track Authority
The Trade Act of 1974,"1 which addressed the United States' involvement
in the Tokyo Round52 of the GATT negotiations, marked the beginning of a
new tool in formulating international trade agreements: fast-track authority. In
addition to being granted advance authority to negotiate trade agreements, the
President was given the responsibility of consulting with the Senate Finance
Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee, and any other committees
impacted by the proposed agreements.53 The President was also required to
notify both houses of Congress ninety days before actually concluding the
agreement, and to seek input from relevant government departments and
agencies, the private sector, and Congress as well.' In return, Congress
modified the House and Senate Rules to provide for an up-or-down vote on the
final draft of the agreement without amendments or redactions.55 Fast-track
authority facilitated a greater cooperation between the legislative and executive
branches by allowing Congress to have more access and input into trade
agreements, and by ensuring that the President would retain his credibility and
status as the United States' primary representative in the eyes of other
negotiating nations.'
51. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 § 102-151, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2913 (1988).
52. The Tokyo Round, the seventh conference of the GATT, was completed in 1979. The
primary focus of this round was the reduction of non-tariff barriers. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note
46, at 21.
53. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 §§ 102-151. See also Sim, supra note 1, at 478 (noting that
the Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 required the President to complete numerous procedural tasks
before gaining access to the fast track procedures).
54. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2913.
55. Id. See also Charnovitz, supra note 7, at 197.
56. Hongju Koh, supra note 4, at 148. The advantages of fast-track authority were fourfold:
First, it allowed Congress to overcome both the political inertia and the procedural
obstacles that frequently prevent a controversial measure from coming to a vote at all.
Second, it controlled domestic special interest group pressures that might otherwise have
provoked extensive, ad hoc amendment of a negotiated trade accord. Third, it bolstered
the Executive Branch's negotiating credibility with United States allies, which had
suffered serious damage during the Kennedy Round, by reassuring trading partners that
negotiated trade agreements would undergo swift and nonintrusive legislative
consideration. Fourth, and finally, it acted functionally like a one-house legislative veto
to control executive discretion, for it authorized either House to block passage of a fully
negotiated trade agreement simply by voting down the agreement or its implementing
legislation.
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Within the last fifteen years, fast-track authority has been a staple for the
United States in the negotiation of international trade agreements. 57  The
Uruguay Round' of the GATT and the North American Free Trade
Agreement 9 are the two most recent and significant trade agreements
formulated under fast-track procedures. The multilateral negotiations for the
Uruguay Round of the GATT began in 1986. 60 The final GA'TT Ministerial
Meetings, signifying the conclusion of the agreement, were scheduled for 1990;
however, these meetings were stalled as a result of a dispute between the United
States and the European Union regarding agricultural subsidies. 6' Had the
Uruguay Round been completed as scheduled in 1990, President Bush could
have submitted the agreement to Congress under fast-track procedures within the
requisite timeframe.62 The disagreement between the United States and the
European Union prevented the agreement from falling within the fast-track
parameters, thereby forcing President Bush to seek an extension of fast-track
authority from Congress.'
When the conclusion of the GATF was immeasurably delayed, the United
States turned its attention to bilateral trade agreements.' "During the summer
of 1990, President Salinas of Mexico requested bilateral negotiations with the
United States for a free trade agreement."' President Bush notified Congress
of his intention to enter negotiations with Mexico, later amending this
57. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
both set forth provisions for fast-track authority. The 1988 Act constitutes the most current
pronouncement of fast-track authority. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat.
2948 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (amending Trade Act of 1974); Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902-2903 (1988). In January of 1988, the United
States concluded a free trade agreement with Canada with the aid of fast-track procedures. Taylor,
supra note 1, at 32. Despite the fact that a dispute arose over whether the Reagan Administration
adequately satisfied the consultation requirement of the 1988 Act, the executive obtained
congressional approval for the agreement by agreeing to work closely with Congress in drafting the
necessary implementing legislation. Id. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, which
was considered by Congress in the summer of 1988, entered into force later that year. Id. See also
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1993).
58. See supra notes 46-47 (describing the nature of the GATT and the definition of "rounds").
59. NAFTA, supra note 11, 32 I.L.M. at 289.
60. WINHAM, supra note 41, at 19.
61. Id. at 86-94.
62. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
63. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
64. Taylor, supra note 1, at 33.
65. Id. (citing Commitment to Reach a North American Free Trade Agreement: Chronology
in Bureau of Public Affairs, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 565-67 (July 20, 1992) (detailing all
communications between the United States and Mexico regarding the negotiation of a free trade
agreement)).
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notification by including Canada in the negotiations.'e However, as in the case
of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the timeframe for fast-track authority,
which was set forth in the 1988 Act, 67 was no longer applicable to the
negotiation of the NAFTA. Therefore, President Bush was required to seek an
extension of fast-track procedures from Congress."
On March 1, 1991, President Bush included both the GATT and the
NAFTA in his request for the extension of fast-track authority.' This request
was supported by a comprehensive review of the Uruguay Round negotiations,
a detailed report by the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and
Negotiations,' and other materials which further illustrated the need for fast-
track authority.7' Nevertheless, the extension request was not warmly received
by Congress, and an explosive debate regarding the extension of fast-track
authority ensued. 2
Two primary arguments arose against the extension of fast-track authority
in Congress. First, many members of Congress opposed the concept of fast-
track authority in general. This opposition was based largely on the premise
that an extension of fast-track authority would signify a surrender of
congressional power.' Not only were these opponents distrusting of both the
executive and the substantive content of the NAFTA, but they also asserted their
belief that Congress ought to exercise more control over the process of
66. Joint Statement Announcing Canada-Mexico-United States Trilateral Free Trade
Negotiations, 1991 PUB. PAPERS 111 (Feb. 5, 1991).
67. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(b)(1)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 2902
(1988). See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 117-18.
69. Message to the Congress Transmitting a Report on Trade Negotiations and Agreements and.
Fast Track Authority Extension, 1991 PUB. PAPERS 206 (Mar. 1, 1991), reprinted in 137 CONG.
REC. H1330 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1991). See also Taylor, supra note 1, at 16. President Bush
combined both the GATT and the NAFTA in one fast-track extension request. Id. at 33. Many
members of Congress opposed the NAFTA; however, Congress had long accepted the use of fast-
track procedures for the GAT'. Id. at 35-38. Thus, by submitting one extension request, which
covered both the GAIT and the NAFTA, the Bush Administration hoped to block any opposition
to fast-track authority, believing that Congress would not willfully jeopardize the GATT. Id.
70. This committee is a private sector advisory group created by the Trade and Tariff Act of
1974.
71. Taylor, supra note 1, at 41. The executive asserted that fast-track procedures guaranteed
a timely and unamended agreement. Id. In addition, fast-track authority was shown to be a strong
incentive for other nations to negotiate agreements with the United States. Id. Finally, the Bush
Administration claimed that fast-track authority makes Congress and the President partners in the
process of negotiating and concluding international trade agreements. Id.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 82-101.
73. "[F]ast track operates like a gun to our head-no amendments, no reservations, take 30 days
and vote up or down." 137 CONG. RFc. S6558 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (quoting Senator
Hollings).
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negotiating and concluding international trade agreements.74 Second, many
members of Congress, having been pressured by lobbying constituent groups,
opposed the extension of fast-track authority for the NAFTA based on labor and
environmental concerns.75 In terms of labor, Congress feared that companies
in the United States would move to Mexico in order to take advantage of lower
wage rates, thereby resulting in job losses and worker dislocation in the United
States.76 In addition, Congress worried that labor dislocation, in the absence
of adequate worker adjustment and retraining programs, would have a
detrimental effect on the United States economy.' With regard to the
environment, Congress asserted that the health and safety standards of the
United States might be attacked as non-tariff barriers to trade.' Congress also
warned of the possibility that United States companies would relocate to Mexico
in order to avoid mandatory compliance with the strict environmental standards
of the United States.' In addition, Congress predicted that transboundary
pollution along the border between the United States and Mexico would increase
as a direct result of United States companies moving south.' Therefore,
because of the opposition to the NAFTA by many politicians, Congress
threatened to reject the request for the extension of fast-track authority by
issuing a procedural disapproval resolution.
8 1
In response to the threat of a procedural disapproval resolution by
Congress, President Bush instituted an Action Plan, in which several promises
were made in exchange for the extension of fast-track authority.' First,
74. Taylor, supra note 1, at 41-42.
75. Sim, supra note 1, at 481. Labor, environmental and consumer groups opposed the
extension of fast-track authority for both the GATT and the NAFTA. Id. "[B]y opposing extension,
. . . [these] groups and others for the first time managed to inject themselves directly into
international trade policymaking." Id.
76. See 137 CONG. REC. H3514 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (detailing how 32 representatives and
13 senators asserted that the NAFTA would result in traumatic job losses in the United States).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 87-96.
78. See 137 CONG. REc. H3549 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
79. Id.
80. See Tim Golden, A History of Pollution in Mexico Casts Clouds Over Trade Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al; Robert Tomsho, Dirty Work: Environmental Posse Fights a Lonely
War Along the Rio Grande, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1992, at Al.
81. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(c)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 2902
(1988). See infra notes 115-16.
82. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON ISSUES
CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1-72 (Comm.
Print 1991) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN]. The Action Plan was intended to reduce any possible
adverse effects of the NAFTA on U.S. jobs in six primary ways. First, the plan provided a
transition period after the removal of tariffs which would permit vulnerable American industries to
adapt. Id. at 42. Second, the plan mandated strict rules of origin to prevent countries, which were
not parties to the NAFTA, from using Mexico as an "export platform." Id. at 44-45. Third,
safeguard measures were to be implemented in order to shield American industries from import
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President Bush committed his administration to maintaining a close relationship
with Congress throughout the negotiation process.8 3 Next, the President
promised to work with Congress to ensure that an effective worker retraining
and assistance program would be implemented for dislocated American
workers." Finally, the executive agreed to develop a joint program with
Mexico to protect the environment.' Ultimately, Congress rejected its
procedural disapproval resolution."
Despite the fact that all of the obstacles of fast-track authority were
removed, Congress, upon enacting the Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution s
regarded the extension as conditioned on the President's negotiating a strong
deal which effectively addressed Congress' labor and environmental concerns. 88
The Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution required the President to satisfy a
specific list of objectives during both the Uruguay Round talks and the NAFTA
negotiations." These objectives mandated that the President satisfy four basic
requirements. First, the resolution mandated that the GATT and the NAFTA
had to provide strict rules of origin' and enforcement measures. 91  Second,
the United States was to be allowed to maintain its health and safety
increases from Canada and Mexico. Id. at 43. Fourth, the Action Plan required the institution of
a worker adjustment program for American workers who lost their jobs as a result of the NAFTA.
Id. at 45-47. Fifth, the plan mandated that restrictions be erected to prevent an influx of Mexican
workers into the United States. Id. Finally, the Action Plan provided a "Memorandum of
Understanding" between the United States and Mexico on such subjects as health and safety, labor
standards, and the resolution of labor conflicts." Id. at 67-81. See also Taylor, supra note 1, at
35-36.
83. ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 2.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 7-8. The Action Plan provided that the United States could exclude products which
did not satisfy health and safety standards. Id. at 7. In addition, the plan promised joint cooperation
with Mexico in improving Mexico's environmental standards and created a border program which
would be dedicated to such issues as air and water pollution, pesticides, and hazardous materials.
Id. at 8.
86. Taylor, supra note 1, at 48. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (describing the
Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution, which was enacted in lieu of the issuance of a procedural
disapproval resolution).
87. Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives with Respect to the U.S. Objectives
that Should Be Achieved in the Negotiations of Future Trade Agreements, H.R. Res. 146, 102d
Cong., (1991) [hereinafter Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution].
88. 137 CONG. REC. H3608 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (statement of Rep. Gephardt). "[The
resolution] presents another course-conditional fast track. Our resolution conditions the
continuation of fast track authority on the President living up to [certain] commitments." Id.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. Rules of origin typically require that, in the case of a free trade agreement, an imported
good originate in one of the member states in order to benefit from the lower tariff rates of the free
trade arrangement. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 46, at 325.
91. 137 CONG. REC. H3589-90 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/6
1996] WILL THE CIRCLE BE UNBROKEN? 165
standards.' Third, measures designed to minimize worker dislocation in the
areas of industry and agriculture were to be permitted.93 Finally, the resolution
required that current United States laws regarding subsidies, dumping, and
unfair trade practices were to remain in force.' In addition to these four
commandments, the Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution required the
implementation of legislation which was aimed at the NAFTA, such as the
institution of worker adjustment programs and joint programs with Mexico
which would address environmental concerns.95 In the event that Congress was
dissatisfied with the contents of the final agreements, the Gephardt-Rostenkowski
Resolution permitted Congress to either rescind its grant of fast-track authority
or reject the NAFTA in its entirety.'
In August of 1992, President Bush concluded the NAFTA negotiations and
submitted the final agreement to Congress.' Despite congressional outcries
that the NAFTA was unsatisfactory for the United States, President Bush
asserted that the executive branch had met its obligations to Congress under both
the Action Plan and the Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution." Thus, the
NAFTA became a highly controversial political issue during the 1992
Presidential elections. Upon taking office, President Clinton tried both to
appease Congress' aversion to the NAFTA and to avoid offending Canada and
Mexico. "°  Clinton kept the final agreement as it was negotiated and
addressed the labor and environmental issues of Congress through the
negotiation of supplemental agreements, which were ultimately folded into the
NAFTA.' Thus, the struggle between Congress and the executive over the
application of fast-track procedures to the negotiations of the GATT and the




95. Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution, supra note 87. Section 7 of this resolution also
required the United States Trade Representative to work with Congress during the negotiations of
the NAFTA. Id.
96. Id. See supra note 88.
97. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the North American Free Trade Agreement, 1992-93
PUB. PAPERS 1595 (Sept. 18, 1992).
98. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
100. Taylor, supra note 1, at 52.
101. Id. These supplemental agreements were concluded in September of 1993. Id. See also
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480
[hereinafter Environmental Cooperation]; North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept.
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter Labor Cooperation].
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III. FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY: ITS SIGNIFICANCE AS AN INSTRUMENT IN
THE NEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. The Application of Fast-Track Procedures
Congress further developed fast-track authority in its modifications of the
1974 Trade Act"tn through the enactment of both the Trade and Tariff Act of
19 84 °3 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.'04 It
should be noted that despite the fact that the 1988 Act is the latest
pronouncement of fast-track authority, the window of time in which the
President was authorized to negotiate trade agreements on the fast-track has
expired under the 1988 Act as of June 1, 19 9 3 ."° Any future grant of fast-
track authority to the executive is solely within the discretion of Congress."°
The framework of fast-track authority under the 1988 Act can best be illustrated
as a two-tiered system. The first tier pertained to agreements which properly
fell within in a specified period of time. l°" The second tier, however, applied
to situations in which the President had to request an extension of fast-track
authority from Congress since the negotiation of the trade agreement took place
after the requisite time period of the 1988 Act."s
102. Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, U.S. Trade and Policy Series No. 20 The Fast Track
Debate: A Prescription for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAw. 183, 184 (1992) (noting that the current
provisions regarding fast-track authority can be found in Sections 1102 and 1103 of the 1988 Act,
which refer to Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974).
103. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.) (amending Trade Act of 1974). The 1984 Trade Act was implemented prior
to the United States' Free Trade Agreements with Canada and Israel. Id. It required the President
to notify and consult with both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee sixty legislative days before giving the requisite ninety-day notice of his intent to sign
a free trade agreement with a country other than Israel or Canada. Id. at 149. The Act also
provided that fast-track authority would automatically be granted where neither committee opposed
the trade negotiations during this sixty-day period. Id. In the event that either committee rejected
the negotiations or the final draft of the agreement during this sixty-day period, Congress would not
grant fast-track authority to the Executive; however, the proposed agreement could still be
introduced through the traditional treaty-making process. Id.
104. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C §§ 2902-2903 (1988)). See also Holmer & Bello, supra note 102, at
185 (explaining that fast-track authority officially expired in January of 1988, but was extended in
the 1988 Act until 1993).
105. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1102(c)(1).
106. Taylor, supra note 1, at 15.
107. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(b)(1)(A).
108. Id. § 1103(b)(l)(B).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/6
1996] WILL THE CIRCLE BE UNBROKEN? 167
The first tier applied fast-track procedures to trade agreements entered into
before June 1, 1991. ' If the negotiation of the trade agreement occurred
prior to this date, the President was required to provide the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means Committees with sixty days' written notice that he
intended to enter into trade negotiations with a foreign nation. " It was at this
point that the consultation period between the legislative and executive branches
was to commence. Second, the President was obligated to notify the House of
Representatives and the Senate of his intention to sign and enter into the
proposed trade agreement no later than ninety calendar days prior to the
conclusion of the negotiations."' Upon entering the agreement, the President
was then required to submit the final draft, a draft of the implementing bill, a
statement of the administration's proposed framework for implementing the.
agreement, and a report detailing all relevant and material information
surrounding the agreement to the House and Senate." 2 Finally, Congress was
required to issue a decision either approving or rejecting the agreement within
sixty days of receiving all of the necessary materials from the executive."
3
If Congress rejected the final draft outright, the President could resubmit the
trade agreement to Congress for consideration, absent fast-track procedures.
114
In addition to approving or rejecting the agreement, the House and the Senate
were entitled to issue a procedural disapproval resolution within the same sixty-
day period.' Such a resolution would disqualify the trade agreement from
the fast-track process based on the executive's failure to satisfy procedural
requirements. "6
The second tier of the fast-track provisions, set forth in the 1988 Act,
applied to the extension of fast-track authority for trade agreements entered after
May 31, 1991, and prior to June 1, 1993." 7 The President, who was required
to make a request for the extension of fast-track authority by March 1,
109. Id. § 1103(b)(1)(A). See also Holmer & Bello, supra note 102, at 184.
110. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1102(c)(3)(B)-(C), 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2902-2903 (1988).
111. Id. § 1103(a)(1)(A). See also Holmer & Bello, supra note 102, at 185.
112. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(a)(2).
113. Id. § 1103(c).
114. Nickels, supra note 2, at 8 (noting, however, that if fast-track authority were not
applicable, Congress would not be bound to a timetable for consideration of the agreement; thus,
filibusters would be possible, and either chamber would be free to amend the agreement under
normal procedures).
115. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(c)(1)(A)-(E).
116. Id. See also Holmer & Bello, supra note 102, at 185 (giving the President's failure to
consult adequately with Congress as an example of conduct which would merit the issuance of a
congressional procedural disapproval resolution).
117. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1103(b)(l)(B), 19 U.S.C. §§
2902-2903 (1988).
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1991, " 8 was also obligated to submit a detailed report to Congress which
contained four primary elements. First, the report had to describe the trade
agreements that had been negotiated under the 1988 Act and give the date on
which they were to be submitted to Congress for approval. "' Second, the
report was to outline the progress made during the negotiations."2 Third, the
report was to set forth the justifications for continuing the negotiations toward
the conclusion of the trade agreement.' Finally, the report had to state the
reasons why an extension of fast-track authority was necessary for the continuing
negotiations." 2 In addition, the private sector Advisory Committee for Trade
Policy and Negotiations" was required to submit a report to Congress by
March 1, 1991, regarding the progress of the negotiations and whether, in the
Committee's opinion, an extension of fast-track authority should be granted."
The final step in the process, under the second tier of the 1988 Act, consisted
of Congress' approval or rejection of the requested extension of fast-track
authority. " This last hurdle in gaining congressional approval for the
extension of fast-track procedures has proven to be extremely arduous for the
executive, since Congress has grown increasingly hesitant to grant such
authority."2 This reluctance reflects the continuing controversy regarding the
propriety of the fast-track process.
B. An On-Going Debate: The Constitutionality of Fast-Track Authority
1. A Constitutional Perspective on Foreign Commerce
The United States Constitution endows the legislative branch with the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes."2 In the case of Gibbons v. Ogden,"2 the Supreme Court
118. Id. §1103(b)(2).
119. Id. § 1103(b)(2)(A).
120. Id. § 1103(b)(2)(B).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1103(b)(2)(C).
123. See supra note 70.
124. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1103(b)(3)(A)-(B), 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2902-2903 (1988).
125. Id. § 1103(b)(1)(B)(i)-ii).
126. See supra notes 72-101 and accompanying text.
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
128. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824) (describing commerce as
"commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated
by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."). In Gibbons v. Ogden, the New York
legislature had granted a right of exclusive use to operate steamboats between New York and New
Jersey to certain individuals. Id. at 1-2. When Thomas Gibbons initiated a steamboat operation of
his own along the same route, a New York court enjoined him from further activity. Id. at 2. The
Supreme Court invalidated the injunction since Ogden's monopoly over the operation of steamboats
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espoused its interpretation of the Constitution regarding Congress' power over
the regulation of commerce. The Court stated that the power to regulate
commerce is vested in the Congress and is plenary; therefore, the
Constitution has designated Congress as one of the two principal players
controlling the international trade of the United States. Despite the fact that fast-
track authority precludes Congress from amending and redacting portions of
proposed trade agreements, Congress still retains the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations. " Thus, fast-track authority does not distort
the true intention of the Constitution since Congress is ultimately responsible for
either approving or rejecting proposed international trade agreements.' 3
The second of the two principal entities involved in the creation of
international trade policy is the executive branch.'32 The Constitution gives
the President the authority to initiate, negotiate, and conclude international
agreements.13  The Supreme Court further illustrated the power of the
President to participate in the arena of foreign affairs in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,'3 in which the Court affirmed the constitutional
framers' intentions that the President serve as the constitutional representative
of the United States with regard to foreign nations.13 Thus, fast-track
authority preserves the executive's role as the primary negotiator and
representative of the United States, thereby enabling the President to conclude
an agreement without the fear that he will be second-guessed by Congress.
violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 196 (stating that "[t]his power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution.").
130. Eleanor Roberts Lewis, The North America Free Trade Agreement, 789 PRAC. L. INST.
511, 517 (1992), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL.
131. Id. at 518.
132. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
133. Id. See also Taylor, supra note 1, at 15.
134. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In this case, the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, charged with
conspiring to sell arms and ammunitions to a foreign country, challenged the constitutionality of a
joint resolution of Congress which empowered the President unilaterally to impose an embargo upon
the sale of such arms if he deemed such action to be necessary. Id. at 311-14. The appellees
contended that the joint resolution was an invalid delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch. Id. at 315. The Court based its holding that the joint resolution was valid on the
executive's authority to serve as the constitutional representative of the United States in foreign
affairs. Id. at 319. "ITlhe President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation. . . [making] treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates."
Id.
135. The President is empowered by the Constitution to initiate and negotiate international trade
agreements and other such treaties, having consulted with and sought approval from a two-thirds
majority of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319
("the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation").
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2. The Propriety of Fast-Track Authority
Even though fast-track authority has been exalted as a revolutionary
instrument in the negotiation and conclusion of international trade agreements,
many objections have arisen regarding its constitutionality and effectiveness.
The primary constitutional objection is that the congressional power to regulate
commerce and foreign relations is steadily being usurped by the executive
branch in the exercise of fast-track authority. 36 Therefore, opponents of fast-
track authority claim that this process defeats the original framers' preservation
of the separation of powers.'37 Some interpretations of the Constitution have
gone so far as to declare that Article I's delineation of the legislative powers
proscribes any delegation of Congress' authority. 38  Critics of fast-track
authority also proclaim that reducing congressional participation in the
formulation of international trade agreements merely to an all-or-nothing vote
creates an atmosphere which is clearly contrary to the American notion of
democracy. 39  However, a close examination of relevant Supreme Court
pronouncements reveals the fallacy of these objections. The Constitution,
although providing for a separation of powers, permits each of the three
branches of government to seek assistance from the other branches in meeting
its unique responsibilities. '"
For example, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,'4' the
136. Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy,
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 654 (1994) (stating that the absolute bar on amendments is
undemocratic).
137. Minter, supra note 2, at 110 (expressing the common belief that these procedures violate
the Constitution's distribution of national power among the legislative and the executive branches
of the national government). See also Goldman, supra note 136, at 654 (stating that fast-track
authority diminishes both the Congress' and the public's ability to fashion the terms and conditions
of an international agreement).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."). See
also J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (delegating congressional
legislative powers to another branch of the government violates the U.S. Constitution).
139. Minter, supra note 2, at 110.
140. Id. at 111. The Constitution creates a partial separation of power in which each branch
may seek assistance, when necessary, from the other branches. Id.
141. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In Nixon, President Nixon
brought suit alleging that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which directs
the Administrator of General Services to take custody of all Presidential papers and tape recordings
to provide for their preservation in the federal archives, violated the Constitution. Id. at 430.
President Nixon objected to the Administrator's request for 42 million pages of documents and 880
tape recordings of conversations, which may have had some relevance to the prosecution of the
Watergate case. Id. at 430-31. President Nixon contended that the Act violated the separation of
powers doctrine since Congress' delegation of authority to a lesser official of the executive branch
impermissibly enhbled the legislature to interfere in matters which are solely within the jurisdiction
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/6
1996] WILL THE CIRCLE BE UNBROKEN? 171
Supreme Court, relying on the constitutional interpretations expressed in the
Federalist Papers of Madison 142 and in the writings of Justice Story, 43
rejected the argument that the Constitution mandates strict independence among
each of the branches of the government.'" Instead, the original framers set
about creating a system in which the branches could delegate authority to, and
seek assistance from, the other branches."' Therefore, the delegation of
congressional authority to the other branches of the government, such as in the
granting of fast-track authority to the President, is permissible within the
confines of the U.S. Constitution.
IV. SYMPTOMS OF THE EROSION OF FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY
A. The Erosion of Fast-Track Procedures
In spite of the many arguments asserted against the use of fast-track
authority as a trade tool, fast-track procedures continue to play a significant role
in the negotiation of international trade agreements; however, in recent years the
potency of the fast-track process has been steadily weakened by both political
and seemingly extraneous forces alike.' For example, lobbying groups have
exerted political pressure on Congress demanding that labor and environmental
of the executive. Id. at 440. The Court, deeming Nixon's argument an "archaic view of the
separation of powers... requiring three airtight departments of government, " held that the Act did
not violate the Constitution since it did not prevent the executive branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned duties. Id. at 443 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F.
Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976)).
142. THE FEDERALiST No. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
[This does] not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no
controul over the acts of each other .... [The true meaning] can amount to no more
than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution, are subverted.
Id.
143. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 525
(Melville M. Bigelow, 5th ed. 1891).
[When we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, and
maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this
maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and
entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence,
the one upon the other, in the slightest degree.
Id.
144. lion, 408 F. Supp. at 443. Despite the fact that each branch of the government can
interpret the Constitution for itself, and that the other branches must respect this interpretation, the
argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority between the three
branches is misconceived. Id.
145. Id. at 443 (citing Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
146. See infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
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issues be excluded from any trade negotiations with foreign nations. 7 These
constituent groups have already influenced the conduct of Congress. During the
fast-track extension debate for the negotiations of the GATT and the NAFTA,
Congress' initial reluctance to grant an extension of fast-track authority and its
enactment of the Gephardt-Rostenkowski Resolution primarily resulted from
intense political pressure by these groups.' 4  By excluding such issues,
however, Congress diminished the negotiating authority of the President during
trade talks. This effect alone is contrary to the fast-track process, which permits
the unilateral negotiation of trade agreements by the President and enhances the
role of the executive as the primary representative of the United States. 49
Another factor which has contributed to the erosion of the fast-track process
is the resurgence of the misguided belief in isolationism."tS This philosophy,
which has resurfaced in light of the 1996 presidential election, urges the United
States to forsake all efforts towards an increased participation in international
trade. "' The proponents of isolationism wish to protect American industries
from international competition; thus, these isolationists condemn the use of any
instrument, such as fast-track authority, which facilitates the expansion of
foreign trade. 5 2
The final factor which has resulted in the diminished effectiveness of fast-
track authority involves the irrelevant demands of party politics.'53 With the
Republicans and the Democrats both scrambling to fill the presidential slot in the
147. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text (discussing the fast-track extension debate
and concerns about the NAFTA and labor in the United States).
149. Hongju Koh, supra note 4, at 144. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
150. For backgound on isolationism in general, see JAGDISH BHAOWATI, PROTECIONISM43-59
(1988); I.M. DESTLER & JOHN S. O'DELL, ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED
STATES TRADE POLITCs 10 (1987).
151. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATr, NAFTA AND
THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER (1993); RAVI BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE:
A PLAN FOR AMERICA'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL (1993); STEPHANIE ANN LENWAY, THE POLITICS OF
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE: PROTECTION, EXPANSION AND ESCAPE (1985).
152. See TIM LANG & COLIN HINES, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: PROTECTING THE FUTURE
AGAINST FREE TRADE 6-7 (1993). But see Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Address at the
Harvard University School of Government (Jan. 18, 1996). In his remarks, Secretary of State
Christopher stated:
As this presidential election year begins, . we're once again hearing from those who
preach the dangerous gospel of protection and isolation. America and the world went
down that road in the 1930's, and our mistake fueled the Great Depression and helped
set the stage for World War 1. Shutting America off from the world would be just as
reckless today as it was in the 1930's .... [W]e must compete, not retreat.
Id.
153. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
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1996 election, partisan campaign strategies have emerged as the cornerstone
upon which foreign trade policy is made."M This extraneous factor played a
major role during the 1992 presidential election and will undoubtedly assume a
similar position in future elections.' 55 Recently, the issue of granting fast-
track authority to President Clinton to negotiate Chile's accession to the NAFTA
arose before Congress; however, a stalemate ensued in Congress as a result of
the present ineffectiveness of the fast-track process. "6 Fast-track procedures
must be modified in order to preserve the competitiveness of the United States
as an international trading partner.
1 5 7
B. Chile's Accession to the NAFTA
1. Chile: An Experiment in Reform
In December of 1994, thirty-four heads of state met in Miami for the
Summit of the Americas," in which the United States, Canada, and the
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean-with the exception of Cuba-
agreed to work towards a free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere by the year
2005. 15 To show their commitment to the "Spirit of Miami, "1" President
154. Peter Morton, Isolationist Fever Creeps Into U.S. Politics, FIN. POST, Dec. 2, 1995, at
6.
155. G. Phillip Hughes, The Americas: One Year After the Summit of the Americas, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 29, 1995, at All. See also Taylor, supra note 1, at 14 n.53.
156. Anne Swardson, Canada, Chile Eye NAFTA-LJke Pact, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1995, at
A15; John Urquhart, Canada, NAFTA Parners Work on Chile's Membership Bid, DOW JONES
INT'L NEWS SERV., Jan. 4, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS; Chile, Canada Free
Trade Compatible with NAFTA, CAP. MK'T. REP., Jan. 24, 1996, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWSPLUS.
157. See infra Section V.
158. U.S. Pushes Forward with Hemispheric Economic Integration initiative, Despite Mexican
Financial Crisis, CHRON. OF LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., June 1995 [hereinafter U.S. Pushes].
159. Stephen Fidler, Faded Spirit of Miami Enthusiasm for Free Trade Accord in the Americas
Has Waned, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, at 18. See also Fauriol & Weintraub, supra note 13, at
123. The so-called 'Spirit of Miami' came about through three significant developments in the
Western Hemisphere:
(1) the hemisphere is awash with subregional efforts to encourage freer flows of trade
and investment: the two most influential forces are the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in the North and the Mercado Comdin del Sur (MERCOSUR) in
the South;
(2) an internal process of political reforms (democratization) and economic liberalization
has transformed Latin America into a dynamic center of market economic experiments;
and
(3) perhaps most significant, much of this forward movement has been possible due to
a remarkably committed political and technocratic leadership.
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Clinton and the leaders of Canada and Mexico formally invited Chile to join the
NAFTA. "" However, the fervor which inspired this commitment to free trade
in the Americas has waned.' Before elaborating on the reasons behind the
delay in Chile's accession to the NAFTA, the situation in Chile itself must be
reviewed.
Of all of the countries in Latin America, Chile has proven to be the
strongest candidate for the fourth chair at the NAFTA table.'63 Chile, located
between the Pacific Ocean and the Andes Mountain range in South America, has
been likened to the prosperous nations on the Pacific Rim." The growing
success in Chile's economy is unlike that of its Latin American neighbors. In
just fifteen years, capitalist economic reforms have resulted in a dramatic
increase in the standard of living for the citizens of Chile.'6 In fact, Chile
initiated its market reforms almost a decade before its Latin American
neighbors, and reduced its trade barriers without expecting reciprocity from
other nations." Ironically, most of these reforms were the product of the
160. Fidler, supra note 159, at 18 (referring to the atmosphere of the Miami Summit which
fostered a keen enthusiasm for spreading free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere). See also
Charles Lunan, Free Trade Legislation is Stalled: Chile Unlikely to Join in NAFTA, SUN-SENTINEL,
Dec. 5, 1995, at ID; Christopher B. Johnstone, Congress Trade Agenda Slim as Second Session
Opens, JEI REP., Jan. 19, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS.
161. Pariente, supra note 10, at *1; Fidler, supra note 159, at 18 (stating that the plan set the
stage for an economic partnership to replace the historically strained relationship between the United
States and Latin America, beginning with Chile).
162. Christopher Chazin, Chile Is No Longer Counting on NAFTA, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov.
27, 1995, at 12 (noting that Chile's chances of joining the NAFrA are steadily slipping away). See
also Fidler, supra note 9, at 6.
163. See Swardson, supra note 156, at A15 (noting that Chile is particularly desirable because
its economy is one of the most open and stable in South America). See also David Hendricks, Chile
Fighting to Join NAFTA, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Aug. 25, 1995, at 18; Yvette Collymore, Chile-
Trade: NAFTA Entry Could Mean Another Star on U.S. Flag, INTER PRESS SFRV., June 6, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS.
164. Next Stop South, NAFTA's Progress, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 1995, at A29 [hereinafter Next
Stop South] (likening Chile to an Asian tiger mistakenly attached to a different continent).
165. Alexandre Barros, The Capitalist Revolution in Latin America: When Will the People Be
Happy?, WASH. Q., Summer 1995, at 103, 104 (noting that 10 percent of the population in
Chile-approximately 1.5 million people-have moved above the poverty line as a result of the
capitalist revolution).
166. Next Stop South, supra note 164, at A29; Ian Brodie, Aiming to Join the Trade Club;
Chile, TIMES OF LONDON, Aug. 14, 1995, available in WESTLAW, NPPLUS, at *1 (stating that
in the past decade, Chile's economy has grown an average of 6% a year and is expected to continue
doing so through the year 2000 as a result of its market reforms); Hughes, supra note 155, at All
(noting that, because of the success of Chile's reforms, many thought that Chile had a better case
for joining NAFTA than Mexico).
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military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. 67 Today, many of
the government leaders in Chile, former leftist intellectuals and politicians who
opposed Pinochet, continue the capitalist policies and reforms initiated during
the dictatorship.16
Following the decline of the Pinochet dictatorship, the administrations of
both Presidents Aylwin Azocar and Eduardo Frei Ruz-Tagle have brought about
a growing economic prosperity to Chile. " Not only has the Chilean
government stabilized its currency and defeated inflation, but it has also
privatized most of its state-owned business entities."17 In addition, the City of
Santiago, the capital of Chile, rivals the most industrious international cities of
the world, such as New York City, Los Angeles, and London. 7' In terms of
social and economic reforms, adherence to democratic policies, and market
readiness, Chile is the most qualified Latin American candidate to join the
NAFTA.'72
Besides Chile's own interests in becoming the fourth member of the
NAFTA, the original signatories also have strong incentives for allowing its
accession. The greatest advantage resulting from Chile's accession to the
NAFTA lies in its precedential value."7 Permitting Chile's entry would mark
167. Barros, supra note 165, at 104. The reforms were possible because there was a
dictatorship that could force them through despite their unpopularity. Id. See also Next Stop South,
supra note 164, at A29 (illustrating that the Pinochet dictatorship combined political repression with
economic liberalization); Brodie, supra note 166, at *1 (stating that "[t]he Chilean Government's
enactment of extensive free-market reforms and pursuit of foreign investment have created the
region's most liberali[z]ed business climate").
168. Barros, supra note 165, at 104. The many leftist opponents of the Pinochet dictatorship
went into exile, fleeing mostly to the Communist nations they had idealized. Id. However, they
soon discovered that the life in socialist and authoritarian societies would not be ideal for Chile. Id.
These exiles later relocated in capitalist states where they saw the same social and economic
problems which plagued Chile much better resolved than they were in the socialist countries. Id.
at 104-05. By the time they returned to Chile after the end of the military dictatorship, the exiles
saw the positive results of the capitalist policies and reforms in Chile. Id. at 105.
169. Pariente, supra note 10, at *1. President Aylwin won Chile's first free presidential
election since the Pinochet dictatorship in December of 1989. Id. President Eduardo Frei, Chile's
present leader, was elected in 1994. Id. Both administrations "reformed the political process
... crushed inflation and brought about record economic growth for Chile. Id. See also Next Stop
South, supra note 164, at A29. For the past eight years, Chile's economy has grown at an annual
rate of 7%. Id. While the unemployment rate in Chile has fallen to a mere 5 %, the investment rate
rests currently at 25 %. Id.
170. See Hughes, supra note 155, at All; Swardson, supra note 156, at AIS.
171. Next Stop South, supra note 164, at A29. One commentator described the city of Santiago
as having "mobile telephones galore, an emerging futuristic skyline and American-educated officials
who wax eloquent on topics such as privati[z]ation and electronic road-pricing." Id.
172. See Tony Munroe, Politics Stall Chile's Entry Into NAFTA, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995,
at Al; Hughes, supra note 155, at All.
173. Next Stop South, supra note 164, at A29; Fidler, supra note 9, at 16.
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the first step towards the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas 74 by
establishing the framework through which future countries will follow. Chile's
enrollment in the NAFTA would also encourage Latin American nations to hold
steadfast to their commitment to social, economic and democratic reforms by
rewarding them both with membership in a comprehensive free trade association
and access to larger markets. 7 5  Finally, such a move would prove to Latin
America that the member states of the NAFTA are sincere in their commitments
to the "Spirit of Miami." 176
NAFTA membership for Chile would impose few risks on the original
signatories. Chile is located approximately eight hours by plane from the United
States. 177 In addition, its population consists of just over fourteen million
people."Z Therefore, the fears that the current members of the NAFTA will
be flooded with illegal Chilean immigrants and that jobs will be diverted to
Chile on a grand scale as a result of granting membership to Chile are highly
improbable.'" In fact, the economies of Canada, Mexico, and especially the
United States stand to benefit tremendously from the accession of Chile and
subsequent Latin American nations to the NAFTA.'" Any obstacles impeding
the progress towards free trade in the Western Hemisphere, therefore, would be
detrimental for the economies of all of the nations in the Americas.
2. Reasons for Delay
Despite the "Spirit of Miami" and the pledged commitment by the nations
in the Americas to work toward free trade, many roadblocks have been thrown
in front of the accession of Chile to the NAFTA. Unfortunately, it appears that
all of these obstacles have been erected by the United States alone."
174. U.S. Pushes, supra note 158.
175. Brodie, supra note 166, at *1 (stating that Chile's accession to NAFTA would send an
emphatic message to other Latin American economies that reforms and the removal of tariffs have
as their reward membership in a free trade organization).
176. U.S. Pushes, supra note 158 (adding that most of the Latin American governments are
waiting to see if the U.S. Congress will permit Chile's accession to the NAF1A before they further
work towards the Free Trade Area of the Americas). See also Hughes, supra note 155, at At 1.
177. Next Stop South, supra note 164, at A29.
178. CHILE: AMERICANS REVIEW 1997, AMERICA'S REvIEW WORLD OF INFORMATION, Aug.
11, 1996, at 24 (stating that as of 1995, the population of Chile topped 14.3 million people).
179. Next Stop South, supra note 164, at A29.
180. Hughes, supra note 155, at Al 1. Currently, Latin America comprises one-quarter of the
world market for United States telecommunications equipment exports. Id. In fact, the export of
U.S. telecommunications equipment to Latin America increased by nearly 50% in 1994, topping
$2.7 billion. Id. The market for telecommunications equipment and services (including long
distance, wireless and data transmission services), however, will continue to flourish only if the
United States and other Latin American nations remain committed to a path toward free trade. Id.
181. Pariente, supra note 10, at *1.
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Generally, the United States is responsible for three basic impediments to the
expansion of the NAFTA at this time.
First, the United States' previously enthusiastic outlook on free trade in the
Americas has dimmed in recent months as a result of the economic crisis in
Mexico"s and its $20 billion bailout of the Mexican government. Resulting
from this diminished enthusiasm for free trade is the renewed belief in
isolationism held by some members of Congress and various political candidates
for the 1996 presidential election. 83  These isolationists range from the
extremists, who are pushing for the United States to pull out of the World Trade
Organization and the NAFTA,'"' to those in Congress who are seeking a
moratorium on new trade agreements and who have refused to support the
extension of fast-track authority for Chile's accession to the NAFTA. 5  The
proponents of isolationism fail to realize that the world has undergone significant
changes since the 1930's. In today's economy, trade is carried on between
different regional blocs, and individual nations are finding that they "are less
masters of their own houses." 1  That is, countries no longer engage in
foreign trade based solely upon the formulation of a national trade policy;
instead, multinational trading blocs are largely becoming the primary players in
the international economy."'
The second obstacle impeding Chile's entry into the NAFTA consists of
Congress' and the Clinton administration's failure to agree on the proper scope
182. Hughes, supra note 155, at AlIl (noting that the value of Mexican currency plummeted
over 60% in a year). See, e.g., Lunan, supra note 160, at ID; Mexican Economy in Turmoil,
DAYTON DAILY NEWs, Dec. 23, 1994, at lIB (explaining that the economic recession in Mexico
was a result of the government's decision to devaluate the peso in attempting to calm Mexico's
financial markets and economic crisis, which were incited by the unrest in Chiapas).
183. Morton, supra note 154, at 6. See also Fauriol & Weintraub, supra note 13, at 131
(stating that the United States cannot isolate itself economically as the rest of the hemisphere looks
outward).
184. Morton, supra note 154, at 6. Pat Buchanan, a conservative Republican candidate for the
presidency, campaigned on a platform of isolationism that looked back to the Smoot-Hawley Act.
Id. In addition to the United States' withdrawal from the World Trade Organization and the
NAFrA, Buchanan is also pushing for the creation of monumental tariffs against countries, including
Canada, with which the United States has a trade deficit. Id.
185. Dole 2: Chile's Fast-Track NAFTA Entry Not Going to Happen, CAP. MARKETS REP.,
Dec. 21, 1995. Bob Dole, Republican Senate Majority Leader and presidential hopeful, opposes
the extension of fast-track authority, stating that Chile's inclusion in the NAFTA "[is] not going to
happen .... I don't think it's a good idea." Id.
186. Now, the Wars Are Economic: Technology's Reach Is Eroding National Sovereignty, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 1995, at A7 (explaining that there is no longer an American economy; there is a global
economy).
187. Id. (emphasizing that there are signs that the world is splitting into three general trading
blocs: Asia, Europe and North America).
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of the extension of fast-track authority."s The Republican-controlled Congress
refuses to extend fast-track authority to the Clinton administration as long as
provisions regarding labor and the environment are part of the negotiating
process.' They argue that such an extension of fast-track authority would
allow the Clinton administration to place undue restraints on foreign imports in
the interest of social policy."9 On the other hand, just as matters regarding
labor and the environment were part of the NAFTA negotiations with Mexico,
the executive branch insists that they must be included in future negotiations
with Chile.' 9 ' The Clinton administration asserts that the inclusion of these
issues in future fast-track negotiations regarding the NAFTA will enable the
United States to enforce labor and environmental agreements with sanctions, as
is the norm in other areas of trade. 19
Finally, Chile's accession to the NAFTA has been obstructed by the purely
irrelevant and ulterior motives of party politics. As the 1996 presidential
election approaches, politicians on both sides of the free trade debate have
placed greater value on partisan campaign strategies, rather than on the United
States' trade policy."' For the Clinton administration, the grant of fast-track
authority, including the ability to negotiate labor and environmental standards,
would be well received by labor and environmental groups, which constitute
significant portions of the voting public.'" In the other partisan camp,
Republican campaign strategies will hardly suffer if the trade agreement with
Chile is never brought to fruition. Free trade is an extremely divisive issue for
the Republican party;'95 therefore, refusing to grant fast-track authority to the
Clinton administration would convey a two-fold benefit to the Republican party.
While keeping the matter of Chile's entry into the NAFTA and the issue of free
trade, in general, out of the election, the Republican party would also prevent
188. Leon Hadar, U.S. Lawmakers Fail to Agree on Critical Trade Legislations, Bus. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1995, at 14 (detailing the fast-track extension debate's arguments against the inclusion of
labor and environmental issues in the negotiation of international trade agreements).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Chile Left Waiting, supra note 10, at 28 (noting that Mexico had to sign side-agreements
consenting to specific labor and environmental standards as part of the NAFI'A negotiations).
192. USTR to Reopen Fast Track Talks with U.S. Congress, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 1, 1995.
193. Hughes, supra note 155, at All. See also Pariente, supra note 10, at *5 (emphasizing
that as the United States presidential election draws near, politicians will likely be swayed by the
polls since "politics have been known to prevail over wisdom").
194. Hughes, supra note 155, at Al1. Even if Congress continues in its refusal to grant fast-
track authority, the administration's staunch and unwavering insistence on the inclusion of these
issues will certainly please the labor and environmental interest groups. Id.
195. Id. The issue of free trade has created a schism in the Republican party. Id. The party
is now divided into protectionist conservatives and free-market conservatives. Id.
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President Clinton from achieving a major trade victory during an election
year. 1
3. The Fatal Consequences of Denying NAFTA Membership to Chile
With the "Spirit of Miami" quickly fading in the minds of politicians
because of the fast-track stalemate in Congress, the United States stands to lose
the most from denying Chile's accession to the NAFTA. In fact, Congress'
continuing refusal to grant fast-track authority would signify much more than the
United States' losing an opportunity to expand the NAFTA for the first time
since its inception. For example, the United States, as a result of the weakened
status of its fast-track procedures, may one day find itself left behind and
excluded from free trade arrangements with foreign nations, such as those in
Latin America. That is, competing international organizations, such as the
European Union"9 and other trade unions, will likely surpass the United States
as a leader in free trade by concluding trade agreements with Latin America
while the United States remains in a quagmire over its domestic implementation
process.'" In addition, the United States would be deprived of its ability both
to encourage democratic social policies among Latin American nations through
the enticement of future trade dealings, and to dispel the old suspicions about the
United States' interests in Latin America.'" Finally, the United States risks
losing the economic benefits which would accompany the growth of free trade
in the Western Hemisphere."
In today's world, instead of conducting highly individualized foreign trade
policies, nations have banded together to form customs unions,2° free trade
196. Id.
197. The European Union (EU) is a supranational organization formed to increase economic
integration and cooperation among the member states. The EU entered into force on November 1,
1993, and was ratified by the 12 members comprising the European Community. The number of
members to the EU is expected to increase by the year 2000, and the EU may become a major
competitor to North America and Asia. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 46, at 1234-45.
198. Hughes, supra note 155, at All.
199. Id.
200. Id. See also James R. Holbein, The Case for Free Trade, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 19 (1992) (explaining that countries which do not seize free trade opportunities are in danger
of being left behind).
201. FoLsoM ET AL., supra note 46, at 410-30. A "customs union" is an organization made
up of individual nations which agree to implement a common external policy regarding foreign trade
policy, such as a unified tariff system applicable to nations not party to the union. Id. In addition,
within a customs union, there are no internal barriers on trade, and each of the members enjoy free
trade with each other. Id. The establishment of a customs union involves great cooperation among
the member states and may even call upon countries to give up some of their individual sovereignty.
Id. The European Union is an example of a customs union. Id. See also Ruth E. Olson, Note,
GATT-Legal Application of Safeguards in the Context of Regional Trade Arrangements and Its
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areas, 2M and common markets 3 in order to amplify their returns from
successful trade dealings. Currently, Chile is vying for membership in one of
two trade organizations: NAFTA and MERCOSUR.' MERCOSUR, which
is a common market comprised of the "Southern Cone" 205 nations of
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay," has also set its sights on one day
merging with the NAFTA, possibly following Chile's lead. However, since
the United States has delayed its commitment to Chile's accession to the
NAFTA indefinitely, and since Chilean President Eduardo Frei has refused to
engage in any negotiations with the United States in the absence of fast-track
authority, Chile has initiated steps toward membership in MERCOSUR. 
21
To make matters worse for the United States, MERCOSUR has made expansion
into Europe a top priority.' In fact, representatives of the Southern Cone
Implications for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1488, 1493-94 (1989)
(comparing customs unions with free trade areas).
202. FOLSOM eT AL., supra note 46, at 410-30. A "free trade area" is an organization
comprised of nations which reduce tariffs between themselves but retain their own trade barriers as
to non-member states. Id. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the NAFTA, and the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) are examples of free trade areas. Id.
203. Id. at 412-14. "Common markets" are trade organizations in which the member nations
impose no barriers on capital, labor or investments upon each other. Id. The Central American
Common Market (CACM) and the Andean Common Market are examples of common markets. Id.
204. Filix Pefia, New Approaches to Economic Integration in the Southern Cone, WASH. Q.,
Summer 1995, at 113. This common market was established for the purposes of expanding trade
among its members, promoting democratic social and economic policies in the region, and
stimulating the national development of its members. Id. at 115. MERCOSUR represents 210
million consumers, roughly 55 % of the Latin American market, and boasts a gross domestic product
of over $800 billion. Id. at 113. Together, the countries of the NAFTA and MERCOSUR
constitute 95% of the market in the Western Hemisphere. Id. MERCOSUR, whose market
surpasses that of Russia, is also the fourth largest economic integration organization, following
NAFTA, the European Union, and Japan. Id.
205. Id.
206. MERCOSUR Countries Reach a Preliminary Agreement for Bolivia to Join Trade Bloc,
CHRON. OF LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., Dec. 14, 1995 [hereinafter Preliminary Agreement].
MERCOSUR recently moved to expand its trade bloc by reaching an agreement to include Bolivia
and by pursuing negotiations with Chile. Id.
207. Pefia, supra note 204, at 118. Pefia notes that MERCOSUR is committed to maintaining
a strong relationship with NAFTA. Id.
[If Chile ultimately does not accede to NAFTA individually, one] scenario would be an
agreement between Mercosur-perhaps including Chile-and NAFTA, following the
pattern of the so-called 4 + 1 agreement (the trade and investment framework accord
signed by the four Mercosur countries with the United States in July 1991).
Id. "The Southern Cone countries,.. . together with NAFTA, will most probably be the two main
pillars of a hemispheric system of free trade and investment." Id. at 121.
208. Hughes, supra note 155, at All.
209. Pefia, supra note 204, at 118. Europe is of vital importance to MERCOSUR because 70%
of Europe's direct foreign investment in South America is focused primarily in the Southern Cone.
Id. In fact, the EU and MERCOSUR have recently initiated negotiations toward a "transatlantic free
trade area." Id.
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nations met with delegates from the European Union"' on December 15,
1995, to sign a cooperation agreement intended to facilitate negotiations for a
future free trade zone.2 ' This proposed trade zone would become the largest
trading bloc in the world.212  Thus, unless Congress and the Clinton
administration come to an understanding soon, the European Union may gain
access to the entire South American region through free trade accords with
MERCOSUR and other Latin American nations, thereby closing the door on all
future free trade dealings with the United States and the other members of the
NAFTA. 213 Recently, Canada and Chile announced that as a result of the
current stalemate regarding fast-track authority in Congress, they will begin
bilateral negotiations towards a free trade agreement. 1 4 Canada and Mexico
have contemplated a similar separate free trade accord with Chile, which would
be folded into the NAFTA once the delay by the United States has been
rectified. 2"S Thus, unless the United States removes the obstacles blocking
Chile's accession to the NAFTA, the trade agreement between Canada, Mexico,
and Chile, which will contain terms and conditions that have not been assented
to by the United States, will ultimately be incorporated into the NAFTA." 6
In addition to the possibilities of being excluded from trade with Latin
America by competing trade organizations and of the discouragement of reform
in Latin America, the United States risks losing out on the tremendous economic
return generated from free trade. In its first year, the NAFTA has generated
significant economic returns for its member nations.217 For example, between
1993 and 1994, United States exports to Mexico rose by 17% to roughly $24.5
210. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 46, at 1234.
211. Debra Percival, Latin America-Trade: MERCOSUR and EU Head for Free Trade, INTER
PRESS SERV. GLOBAL INFO. NErwoRK, July 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS;
MERCOSUR Leaders Talk Consolidation Ahead of EU Accord Signing, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec.
8, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS.
212. Preliminary Agreement, supra note 206.
213. Hughes, supra note 155, at All.
214. Swardson, supra note 156, at A15. Expanding its trade with Chile is of vital importance
to Canada. Id. Presently, more than 80% of Canada's export and import dealings are made with
the United States, thereby solidifying Canada's dependence on the United States. Id. Canada has,
thus, pursued the expansion of its trading networks with Chile in order to stem its growing
dependency on the United States. Id. It should also be noted that Chile already has a free-trade
agreement with Mexico. Id.
215. Chile May Get Deal on NAFTA Says U.S., ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 1995, at El
[hereinafter Chile May Get Deal] (explaining that the separate trade accord with Chile would cover
items of interest to the three countries until Washington rejoins negotiations).
216. Swardson, supra note 156, at A15. This agreement will serve as a bridge to full NAFTA
membership for Chile and will be folded into NAF'A once accession negotiations are completed.
Id. See also Chile May Get Deal, supra note 215, at El.
217. Free Trade Must Overcome Obstacle, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 5, 1995, at
6AI.
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billion.2"' Conversely, Mexican exports to the United States rose to $23.4
billion, increasing by 21% from 1993.2"9 Overall, the United States' trade
with Canada grew to $109 billion while trade with Mexico generated almost
$1.5 billion.'m Inviting Chile, which has a stable and booming economy, to
join the NAFTA can only increase the economic benefit for all nations
concerned. In addition, Chile's entry into the NAFTA would convey the
message to other growing Latin American countries, such as the Southern Cone
nations, that NAFTA membership for them is no longer speculative and remote.
The United States' history of promoting social, economic, and political policies
in Latin America has been riddled with overtones of dominance, exploitation,
and outright bullying; thus, many countries to the south have eyed their
interactions with the United States suspiciously."l Nonetheless, the possibility
of creating a free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere provides the means
through which the United States and other NAFTA members may foster
democratic reforms throughout South America in a more digestable manner.'
The promotion of reforms regarding economic and political development through
the enticement of future membership in economic integration associations insures
a more stable and secure environment for all nations in the Western
Hemisphere.' The United States' failure to bring about the realization of its
commitment to a free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere may lead to the
discouragement of all types of reform in Latin America. Thus, with the
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (emphasizing that the combined Gross Domestic Product of the members of NAFTA
was 25% larger than that of the EU in 1994).
221. Fauriol & Weintraub, supra note 13, at 129.
222. Warren Christopher, America's Leadership, America's Opportunity, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Spring 1995, at 6 (noting that countries which adhere to democratic ideals are less likely to go to
war with each other and to disregard fundamental principles of international law).
Democratic nations are critical to building a world where long-term stability is
strengthened by accountable governments, not weakened by dictatorships; a world where
disputes are mediated by dialogue, not by repression and violence; where information
flows freely; and where the rule of law protects property, contracts, patents, and the
other essential elements of free-market economies.
Id. See also Holbein, supra note 200, at 24. Free trade agreements such as the NAFTA not only
serve "as a model for market oriented policies and reforms elsewhere in the hemisphere," but they
also spur nonmember countries on to raise their level of national and economic development in order
to one day be rewarded with membership in such organizations. Id. See also Brodie, supra note
166, at *1 (noting that "[b]y admitting Chile to Nafta, Washington would send an emphatic signal
to far larger Latin American economies, such as Brazil and Argentina, that reforms and removal of
tariffs have as their reward membership in a free-trade club").
223. Christopher, supra note 222, at 6. In order for the United States to remain competitive,
it must promote open markets and sustainable economic growth. Id. The consequences of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act taught the United States that isolationism will weaken economic security.
Id. The United States can only thrive "in a world where trade is rising and barriers are falling."
Id.
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realization of a free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere within view, the
socioeconomic future for all of the American nations appears promising.
V. OPTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE: A RENEWED AND INVIGORATED FAST-TRACK
As the extension period for fast-track authority set forth in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 has expired, and as Congress currently
contemplates a subsequent granting of fast-track authority to President Clinton
for the negotiation of Chile's accession to the NAFTA, the time to revise these
fast-track procedures is at hand. One of the primary purposes of this Note is
to set forth a proposed modification of fast-track procedures in a future trade act
by amending the current provisions in the 1988 Act. 2  Fast-track authority
should be modified so as to facilitate greater ease in both the conclusion of
international trade agreements and the implementation of these agreements into
United States law. Future revisions of the present version of fast-track authority
should also strive to enhance the competitiveness of the United States in the
growing global economy and to preserve the credibility of the executive as the
primary representative of the United States in all foreign matters.
A. Proposal for the Revision of Fast-Track Procedures
Sec. 1102. Trade Agreement Negotiating Authority
(c) Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements Involving Tariff
and Non-Tariff Barriers.
(1) The President may enter into bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements with foreign countries that provide for the elimination
or reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade
between the United States and the countries concerned.
(2) A trade agreement may be entered into under paragraph (1)
with any foreign nation only if-
(A) the agreement satisfies or makes progress in achieving
the objectives set forth in section 1101(a) of this subtitle;
224. This note modifies the fast-track process by amending sections 1102 and 1103 of the 1988
Act, which are the most current pronouncements of fast-track, despite the fact that this authority has
expired as of 1993. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §§ 1102, 1103, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2902-2903 (1988). See infra section V.A. Note that the proposal sets forth only those
sections of the 1988 Act which will be amended. For a complete discussion and summary of the
entire revised process, see infra section V.B.
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(B) such foreign country requests the negotiation of such an
agreement; and
(C) the President, no later than ninety (90) days prior to the
date notice is given to the House of Representatives and the
Senate of the intention to enter the agreement under section
1103 of this title-
(1) provides written notice of such negotiations to the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, the Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, and
any other congressional committee possessing relevant
subject matter jurisdiction over legislation which would
be affected by the trade agreement; and
(2) consults with such committees regarding the
negotiation of said agreement.
(d) Consultation with Congress before agreement entered into.
(1) Before the President enters into any trade agreement under
subsection (c), the President shall consult with-
(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
and
(B) any other committee which has relevant subject matter
jurisdiction over legislation which would be affected by the
trade agreement.
(2) The consultation under paragraph (1) shall consist of-
(A) the nature of the agreement;
(B) the extent to which the agreement will satisfy or make
progress in achieving the objectives set forth in section
1101(a) of this title; and
(C) all matters relevant to the implementation of the
agreement under section 1103 of this title.
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Sec. 1103. Implementation of Trade Agreements
(b) Application of Congressional "Fast-Track" Procedures to Implementing
Bills.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the provisions of section 151
of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "fast-track
procedures") shall apply to implementing bills submitted with respect
to all trade agreements entered into under section 1102(c).
(2) The fast-track procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill
submitted with respect to a trade agreement if both Houses of
Congress separately agree to procedural disapproval resolutions within
any sixty-day period.
(A) Procedural Disapproval Resolutions-
(i) in the House of Representatives-
(I) shall be introduced by the chairman or ranking
minority member of the Committee on Ways and
Means or the chairman or ranking minority member of
the Committee on Rules,
(II) shall be jointly referred to the Committee on Ways
and Means and the Committee on Rules, and
(III) may not be amended by either Committee, and
(ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of the
Committee on Finance.
(B) For purposes of this subsection, the term "procedural
disapproval resolution" means a resolution of either House of the
Congress which declares that since the President has failed or
refused to consult with Congress on trade negotiations and trade
agreements, fast-track procedures will not apply to the
implementation of any trade agreement.
B. Application and Comments Regarding the Amended Fast-Track Process
As amended, the fast-track process will consist of many of the original
elements that comprised the 1988 Act, while incorporating new measures which
will result in a more effective trade tool for both the executive and legislative
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branches. The most significant change from the 1988 Act lies in the new scope
of fast-track authority. Under the proposed revision, fast-track authority will no
longer be constrained by a restrictive expiration period.'m Instead, fast-track
procedures will apply generally to all multilateral and bilateral trade agreements
unless Congress, in determining that the executive has failed to satisfy the
procedural requirements of the process, issues a procedural disapproval
resolution. ' Thus, the modification eliminates the second tier of the 1988
Act in which the executive was required to seek an extension of fast-track
procedures. 7  The revision will prevent the recurrence of situations in which
Congress conditioned its grant of fast-track authority upon peripheral issues by
insuring that environmental and labor matters are within the executive's
negotiating authority. In addition, the proposal also provides that the grant of
fast-track authority will no longer hinge on considerations such as political
campaign strategies.' The revised process will now consist of only two
stages: the negotiation stage and the approval stage.'m  Nevertheless, the
primary elements of the fast-track process will remain largely unchanged.
During the negotiation stage, the fast-track process will still be initiated by
a foreign country's request to negotiate an international trade agreement with the
United States.' Upon obtaining such a request, the executive branch must
notify in writing the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Ways and Means
Committee, and any other congressional committee which possesses relevant
subject matter jurisdiction at least ninety legislative days"3 prior to the
President's notifying both houses of Congress of his intent to enter into trade
negotiations. Under the 1988 Act, the President was required to provide notice
only to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee sixty legislative days prior to notifying the House and the Senate of
225. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(b)(1)(A)-(B), 19 U.S.C. §
2903 (1988). See supra Section V. A.
226. The procedural disapproval resolution process of the 1988 Act remains unchanged in form.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(c)(1)(A)-(E). See supra notes 115-16
and accompanying text.
227. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(B). See supra notes 117-
126 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 193-96 (describing the partisan campaign strategies
which currently are impeding Chile's accession to the NAFTA).
229. See infra notes 230-40 and accompanying text. Unlike the tiered system of the original
1988 Act, in which the second level applied only in the event that a trade agreement was to be
negotiated subsequent to the date specified in the first level, both of the proposed revision's stages
will apply in every situation since there will no longer be an expiration date for fast-track authority.
230. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1102(c)(3)(B), 19 U.S.C. §§
2902-2903 (1988).
231. See Lewis, supra note 130, at 512 (stating that legislative days are those in which both
the House and Senate are either in session or in adjournment for less than three days).
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the proposed trade negotiations. 2  However, by expanding both the
notification time period and the committees to whom the President must notify,
the proposed revision will provide more time and more participants for the
consultation process. In addition, as in the 1988 Act, the executive is required
to interact with the International Trade Commission," 3 the aforementioned
congressional committees, and private sector advisory groups' as part of the
consultation process. Finally, at the conclusion of the negotiation stage, the
President must submit the agreements, other required materials, 5 and written
notice of his intention to enter the agreements to the House and Senate at least
ninety days prior to the signing of the agreement.'
The approval stage of the modified fast-track process commences upon
Congress' receipt of all the necessary documentation. Congress then has ninety
legislative days 7 in which to approve or reject the agreements without
amendments.' However, in the event that Congress finds a procedural defect
which disqualifies the trade agreement from receiving fast-track treatment,
Congress, as in the 1988 Act, is entitled to issue a procedural disapproval
resolution. 9 That is, if the executive fails to provide the required notice of
its intentions to negotiate or conclude a trade agreement, to consult adequately
with Congress, or otherwise fails to fulfill an obligation in accordance with fast-
track requirements, Congress may withhold the application of fast-track
procedures to the trade agreement.' This procedural disqualification
privilege guarantees not only the swift execution of a proposed international
trade agreement, but also that the executive branch performs its mandated
obligations in a manner which adequately satisfies Congress.
232. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1102(c)(3)(C)Ci). See supra note
110 and accompanying text.
233. Lewis, supra note 130, at 517.
234. Id.
235. These materials consist of a draft of an implementing bill, a statement of any
administrative action that must be taken to implement the agreement, and other supporting
information. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(a)(1)(B). See supra note
112 and accompanying text.
236. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(a)(1)(A), 19 U.S.C. §§
2902-2903 (1988). See supra text accompanying note 111.
237. See Lewis, supra note 130, at 517 (noting that the approval period consists of ninety
legislative days if tariffs are involved, or sixty legislative days if only non-tariff barriers are
involved).
238. Id.
239. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(c)(1)(A)-(E). See supra
notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
240. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1103(c)(1)(A)-E). See supra notes
125-26 and accompanying text.
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Despite the predicted improvements afforded to the status of fast-track
authority, several arguments will undoubtedly arise against the proposed
revision. For example, critics may adhere to the traditional assertion that any
form of fast-track authority reduces Congress' role in foreign commerce to that
of a rubber stamp." This argument is premised on the belief that because
amendments to the proposed trade agreement are absolutely barred, congress-
ional control over United States trade policy is drastically usurped by the use of
fast-track procedures.4 2  Thus, Congress and the public in general are
prevented from influencing the content of trade agreements, contrary to the
notion of democracy.4 3  However, this argument overlooks the fact that
Congress presides in judgment over every proposed international trade
agreement by approving or rejecting the final draft.' Thus, under the fast-
track process, Congress possesses a type of veto power over trade proposals
which results in an equal partnership between the legislative and the executive
branches.'
A second likely argument against the proposed revision of fast-track
authority lies in the frequent criticism that the executive has continuously failed
to consult adequately with Congress during the negotiation stage of the fast-track
process. ' Although this point bears valid merit, this argument overlooks
Congress' power to issue procedural disapproval resolutions as a result of the
executive's failure to comply with procedural requirements. In addition,
Congress may also use its veto power to reject any agreement with which it
disagrees. Thus, the congressional veto power and the procedural disapproval
mechanism provided for in this process enables Congress to influence the
executive's compliance with fast-track requirements.
Finally, opponents of the proposed amendments may assert the view that
fast-track authority is no longer a necessary instrument in the negotiation and
conclusion of trade agreements. 247 This argument, however, fails to recognize
241. See Goldman, supra note 136, at 655-58.
242. Id. at 655. Goldman notes that "[t]hrough the no-amendment rule, Congress relinquishes
much of its power to determine the terms of trade agreements. That power accretes to the President,
who can alone determine what will be negotiated and what limits will be placed on domestic
prerogatives." Id.
243. Id.
244. See Taylor supra note 1, at 15. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
245. Taylor, supra note 1, at 32-36 (detailing Congress' dissatisfaction with President Reagan's
consultation with Congress for the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and President Bush's
consultation with Congress for the NAFTA).
246. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
247. Goldman, supra note 136, at 658. Goldman asserts that fast-track procedures have
become obsolete. Id. She adds that the negotiation of the Supplemental Agreements on Labor and
Environmental Cooperation demonstrates that the United States can reopen trade agreements, such
as the NAFTA, and obtain additional concessions in order to satisfy Congress. Id. See also
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the importance of a system in which trade agreements may be expeditiously
negotiated, concluded and implemented. Only through such a process may the
United States maintain its competitiveness in international trade.24 Fast-track
authority enables the negotiation process to progress more efficiently by
guaranteeing that agreements are timely executed in a way which best reflects
the expectations of the negotiating parties. 9 Thus, foreign nations will have
a strong incentive to engage in negotiations with the United States if fast-track
procedures are a part of the agreement process.' ° Finally, an efficient system
of formulating trade accords will ultimately prevent the United States, which is
currently handicapped by the present fast-track process, from being surpassed
by its trade competitors. 25' Therefore, fast-track authority can no longer be
considered an optional or obsolete instrument in world trade; instead, fast-track
authority will undoubtedly prove to be indispensable to the United States in the
years to come.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fast-track process is essential to the negotiation and conclusion of
international agreements in the modern era of global trade. In fact, without fast-
track authority, the United States will likely lose its status as a world leader in
international trade since its traditional treaty-making process has proven to be
unwieldy, unreliable, and cumbersome. Despite the obvious advantages
provided by this trade tool, fast-track procedures have slowly begun to erode in
recent years. The controversy surrounding Chile's accession to the NAFTA
exemplifies the trend toward a weakening of fast-track authority. Therefore, the
fast-track process must be amended and modified to ensure that future trade
agreements may be implemented in the most efficient and expedient manner
possible.
Fast-track procedures should become a permanent instrument in the
negotiation of trade agreements, unfettered by any congressionally mandated
expiration dates. In addition, by modifying the time and notice requirements of
fast-track authority, as well as by adjusting the extent to which the principal
players will participate in the negotiation of trade agreements, this proposed
Environmental Cooperation, supra note 101, 32 I.L.M. at 1480; Labor Cooperation, supra note 101,
32 I.L.M. at 1499.
248. See Hughes, supra note 155, at All. See also Taylor, supra note 1, at 131.
249. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 41 (setting forth President Bush's assertions regarding the
benefits of fast-track authority for the negotiation of the GATT and the NAFTA).
250. Id. See also supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (illustrating the incentives for
countries to negotiate with the United States in the future as a result of fast-track procedures).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 197-223 (illustrating the competition afforded by the
European Union and MERCOSUR to the United States in the expansion of free trade around the
world).
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revision of fast-track procedures will continue to adhere to the policy goals and
objectives of the United States. In short, if the United States wishes to continue
to benefit from its trade relationships with foreign nations, and to retain its
position of leadership in the expanding world order, it must embrace a renewed
and invigorated fast-track process as the means to these ends.
Melissa Ann Miller
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